Privacy evaluation: what empirical research on users’ valuation of personal data tells us by Federico Morando et al.
04 August 2020
POLITECNICO DI TORINO
Repository ISTITUZIONALE
Privacy evaluation: what empirical research on users’ valuation of personal data tells us / Federico Morando; Raimondo
Iemma; Emilio Raiteri. - In: INTERNET POLICY REVIEW. - ISSN 2197-6775. - ELETTRONICO. - 3:2(2014), pp. 1-11.
Original
Privacy evaluation: what empirical research on users’ valuation of personal data tells us
Publisher:
Published
DOI:10.14763/2014.2.283
Terms of use:
openAccess
Publisher copyright
(Article begins on next page)
This article is made available under terms and conditions as specified in the  corresponding bibliographic description in
the repository
Availability:
This version is available at: 11583/2545738 since:
Internet Policy Review
Internet Policy Review. Journal on internet regulation
Volume 3 | Issue 2
Internet Policy Review | http://policyreview.info 1 May 2014 | Volume 3 | Issue 2
 
Privacy evaluation: what empirical research on users’ valuation
of personal data tells us
Federico Morando
Director of Research and Policy & Research fellow, Nexa Center for Internet & Society,
Politecnico de Torino, federico.morando@polito.it
Raimondo Iemma
Managing director and doctoral researcher, Nexa Center for Internet & Society,
raimondo.iemma@polito.it
Emilio Raiteri
Researcher, "Cognetti de Martiis" Economics and Statistics department,
emilio.raiteri@unito.it
The EU General  Data  Protection Regulation is  supposed to  introduce  several  innovations,
including the right of data portability for data subjects. In this article, we review recent literature
documenting experiments  to  assess  users’  valuation of  personal  data,  with  the  purpose  to
provide policy-oriented remarks. In particular, contextual aspects, conflicts between declared
and revealed preferences, as well as the suggestion that personal data is not conceivable as a
single  good,  but  instead  as  a  bundle,  are  taken  into  account,  also  discussing  potential
shortcomings and pitfalls in the surveyed experiments. Data portability is supposed to increase
consumer empowerment; still, several technological preconditions need to apply to make this
right actually enforceable.
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It  could be argued that  the European Commission proposal  for  a  General  Data Protection
Regulation (PDF) is  far more ‘Internet-aware’  than its  predecessor (still  in force) Directive
95/46/EC (PDF), by taking into account challenges related to data exchange happening online.
Several rules are being enhanced, e.g., ex ante privacy assessment for the data controller, new
requirements  in terms of  ‘privacy by design’  and ‘privacy by default’  measures,  as  well  as
stronger sanctions in case of breach. Moreover, new rights are being introduced, such as data
portability (Article 18), for which the data subject has the right to obtain from the data controller
a copy of the data, and transfer it to another information system. While the measures may be
effective in some regards, there is reason to question if the underlying assumptions about user's
valuation  of  privacy  are  being  taken  into  account  sufficiently.  As  a  contribution  to  this
discussion, we report a review of the recent economic literature aimed at empirically assessing
users’ (i.e. in particular, internet users’) valuation of their personal data1, suggesting possible
limitations and pitfalls in the experiments, and drawing policy-oriented remarks focused on
data portability.
As far as the scope of this article is concerned, we derive the definition of ‘personal data’ from
the one suggested in the OECD Privacy Guidelines (1980), i.e. “any information relating to an
identified or identifiable individual (data subject)”2.
As indicated by the OECD (2013), with ‘value of personal data’ we may mean their market
valuation, or the valuation expressed by individuals (the latter being the focus of the article at
hand). Examples of market valuation methodologies encompass the calculation of the ratio
between an indicator of performance of a data holder (i.e. capitalisation, or annual income) and
the number of users, thus deriving the value of a single profile; the observation of market prices
for personal data; as well as the cost of a data breach (Ponemon and Symantec, 2011). Individual
valuations are instead inferred through surveys and/or economic experiments.
THE ECONOMICS OF PERSONAL DATA
If  one  matches  the  exponential  reduction  in  the  cost  of  managing  information  with  the
exponential growth in the amount of information shared in a digital environment by users, the
trivial outcome is that organisations are increasingly in the position of holding information
about individuals. A single consumer can experience both benefits and costs from the disclosure
of personal information (Hann, 2007). At the same time, an organisation gains clear advantages
from being able to increase its knowledge about consumers’ identity and behaviour. Still, it may
deem detrimental for its own business to design too invasive policies (Acquisti, 2010). For all
actors, what seems to matter is that personal data (regardless of its amount) is used in an
appropriate context (Nissembaum, 2004). Back in 1996, Varian suggested that some forms of
annoyance  may  arise  when  the  seller/service  provider  has  too  little  (and  not  ‘too  much’)
information about the user. Others, such as Acquisti (2010), include ‘psychological discomfort’
amongst the negative externalities affecting consumers receiving customised ads.
DO PEOPLE VALUE PRIVACY?
THE PRIVACY PARADOX
Spiekermann et al. (2001) suggest that even privacy conscious individuals are likely to share
sensitive information with strangers, in particular online. As observed by the authors, most
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people  do  not  “live  up  to  their  self-reported  privacy  preferences”.  Applying  the  “revealed
preferences” theory3, this and similar evidence has been used to argue that our society, quite
simply, does not place much value on privacy.
The conflict between declared and revealed preferences seems to be the starting point of the
empirical assessment of the value of personal data online analysed here. Consumers express
concerns regarding misuse of personal data, e.g., they describe themselves as worried and state
their  high  evaluation  of  personal  data  and  privacy,  in  response  to  various  kinds  of
questionnaire-based surveys. Yet, they continue to provide personal data on social networks,
online shopping, and other sites.
Similar conclusions are reached in other studies. For instance, Acquisti and Grossklags (2005)
report  in  a  sample  interviewed in  the  US,  that  almost  90% of  individuals  declared  to  be
moderately or very concerned about privacy, but more than 20% of the people in the same
sample  admitted  to  have  disclosed  their  social  security  number  (a  very  sensitive  piece  of
information)  for  discounts  or  better  services.  Almost  30% did  the  same with  their  phone
number.
Similarly, Beresford et al. (2012) built an experiment whose conclusions suggest that people are
not sensitive to privacy concerns in their actual behaviour, even if they state they are: in a
sample of 225 German students, participants were willing to provide information about their
monthly income and date of birth for a one Euro discount. Even in a context of equal prices, the
choice between two different firms to purchase a DVD seemed to give a virtually zero premium
to the more privacy-friendly vendor. Nevertheless, in the post-experimental questionnaire, 75%
of the participants indicated that they have a very strong interest in data protection.
THE ROLE OF CONTEXTUAL INFORMATION
However, as observed by Acquisti and Grossklags 2005, “[i]ndividuals make privacy-sensitive
decisions based on multiple factors, including (but not limited to) what they know, how much
they  care,  and  how costly  and  effective  they  believe  their  actions  can  be.”  Therefore,  the
dichotomy between expressed and revealed preferences does not necessarily imply irrationality
or the existence of a paradox. Indeed, an entire strand of literature questions the idea that less
privacy is  the social  norm and it  argues that  privacy valuations are extremely sensitive to
contextual effects.
The endowment effect
Acquisti  et  al.  (2009)  investigate  individual  privacy  valuations  in  a  series  of  experiments
informed  by  behavioural  economics.  The  authors  highlight  that  discussions  about  privacy
valuations often conflate two different types of transactions: the ones in which individuals are
offered benefits in exchange for their personal information, and the ones in which individuals
are  offered  protection  of  their  personal  information,  but  at  some  cost.  Therefore,  they
investigate the presence of  any significant difference between the “willingness to pay”4) to
protect individuals’ privacy and their “willingness to accept” money (WTA5) in order to give up
privacy protection. The latter authors hypothesise that individual privacy valuations are not as
stable or internally consistent as the standard economic perspective assumes and argue that
preferences about privacy may critically depend on the context and in particular on initial
endowment. They test their hypothesis in a series of experiments in which subjects were asked
to choose between gift cards that varied in terms of privacy features and monetary values. Then
they investigated subjects’ willingness to keep versus exchange a specific gift card as a function
of initial endowment. More than half of subjects endowed with a completely anonymous $10 gift
card rejected an offer of $2 to reveal their future purchase data. By contrast, fewer than 10% of
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subjects endowed with the identified $12 card chose to give up $2 to protect future purchase
data. These results imply that consumers endowed with different levels of privacy protection
valued the same good, i.e. future privacy protection, in a substantially different way. Most of the
consumers whose privacy was fully protected did not considered $2 as a price high enough to
sell their future purchasing data, while nine out of ten of the not protected individuals estimated
$2 as a too high price to buy protection for future purchase data.The results of the experiment
therefore suggest that when consumers feel that their privacy is protected, they might value it
much more than when they feel their data has already been, or may be, revealed.
Privacy complexities
Many internet users feel that privacy policies are complex and hard to communicate. Despite
this general feeling, some authors show that more prominent privacy information will induce
consumers to incorporate privacy considerations into their online purchasing decisions.
Tsai et al. (2010) ran an online shopping experiment, in which different sets of participants were
asked to test a new search engine whose results were annotated with icons, and to purchase two
different products online, one characterised by low privacy concern and the other by higher
privacy concerns (AA batteries and a sex toy, respectively) using their personal credit card.
Some of the participants were exposed to icons based on an analysis of the site's privacy policy
(while, in two control conditions, the icons either indicated ostensibly irrelevant information or
were absent). Results showed that participants in the privacy information condition were more
likely than those in the control conditions to make purchases from websites offering medium or
high levels of privacy, even when the price was higher than the price on other sites, for both
products. Quite surprisingly, the premium to privacy was similar in purchasing the batteries and
the sex toys.
In a similar experiment performed by Egelman et al. (2012), 25% of the participants (confronted
with  four  screenshots  including  permission  requests  for  activities  such  as  internet  access,
location, audio recording) stated a willingness to pay a $1.50 premium on a $0.49 Android
application, in order to grant the fewest possible privacy permissions.
Individuals’ heterogeneity
Several studies find various groups or clusters of individuals, with homogeneous intra-group
characteristics and significant inter-group heterogeneity in terms of privacy preferences. For
instance, Hann et al. (2007) find three different clusters in terms of privacy evaluation: ‘privacy
guardians’, i.e. people who attach a relatively high value to information privacy; ‘information
sellers’, who tend to give away personal information with little regard for privacy policies; and
‘convenience seekers’, people who prefer convenience with little regard for money or website
privacy policies. According to these authors, privacy guardians are the vast majority (between
70% and 85% of their sample), but other experiments and analysis identify similar groups with
completely  different  proportions.  For  instance,  according  to  Westin  (2001),  ‘privacy
fundamentalists’ are about 25% of the sample, in Krasnova et al. (2012) ‘Privacy-concerned’
represent 33% of the full sampled population, while McKinsey (2010) identifies a much smaller
set of highly privacy-concerned people (about 1%).
TRADING PRIVACY  
PRIVACY STATEMENT AND POTENTIAL SUBSTITUTES
Despite the commonly shared experience that privacy notices are frequently neglected, there is
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empirical evidence that the existence of a privacy statement makes people more available to
share data, even for free (Hui et al., 2007; Tsai et al., 2010;  Hann et al., 2007; Tucker, 2012).
That said, privacy statements only represent one condition and, not necessarily a sufficient one,
to create a trusted relationship with the users of an online service. For instance, Joinson et al.
(2010) find the existence of a compensatory relationship between privacy and trust, therefore
recommending  to  businesses  eager  to  collect  users'  personal  information to  increase  their
trustworthiness (e.g., with a ‘professional’ look & feel of their website), rather than providing
users with stricter privacy policies.
CONVENIENCE AND PERSONALISATION
Several studies (Hann et al., 2002; Hann et al., 2007; Tucker, 2012) show that individuals are
willing to trade personal information in order to gain convenience in terms of time saving and
personalisation of web services. As already mentioned, several studies, such as Hann et al.
(2007), identify various groups of users, some of which are more willing to exchange their data
in exchange of monetary incentives and some others in exchange of other forms of convenience,
in particular time-saving features. This is not surprising, since, for instance, the opportunity
cost of time greatly differs amongst people.
SOCIAL REWARDS
Even in the absence of any monetary or other tangible rewards, social rewards are attractive in
balancing privacy concerns and governing individuals’ behaviour as well (Jiang et al., 2013).
For instance, in social networks the social reward increases with the size of one’s network.
Therefore  a  larger  network is  expected to  lead to  higher  disclosure  levels,  as  observed by
Krasnova et al. (2009).
MONETARY INCENTIVES
Most of the recent surveys and experiments that deal with privacy evaluation confirm that
financial incentives lead people to disclose more information or that people concerned about
privacy are willing to pay a premium price in order to avoid disclosure  (see, e.g., Beresford et
al., 2012; Carrascal et al., 2011). For instance, Hann et al. (2007), analysing the results of a
survey conducted in the US and Singapore,  find that  a  sufficiently  large monetary reward
significantly increased the relative attractiveness of a website regardless of its privacy policy.
Carrascal et al. (2011) carried out an experiment in which they monitored online activities of
participants and asked them (through pop-up windows) the minimum value they would accept
to sell a specific piece of personal information to a private company. While the price asked for
different kinds of private information showed great variability, participants generally proved to
be  willing  to  trade  private  information  for  monetary  rewards.  As  far  as  WTP  to  protect
information is concerned, Hann et al. (2002) show that the disallowance of secondary use of
personal information is worth between $40 and $50. Similarly, Krasnova et al. (2009) observe
that, on average, a user would be ready to pay between 14 and 17 Euros per year, if the social
network providers refrained from using his or her demographic information for personalised
advertising. Bauer et al. (2012) organised an experiment in which participants were asked to
make a bid to migrate their Facebook profile information to Google Plus, asking participants to
simulate the situation in which Facebook was about to be shut down. They find out that, on
average, participants would pay 9.40 Euros to save their personal profile.
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LIMITATIONS AND PITFALLS IN THE REVIEWED
EXPERIMENTS
The limitations of the surveys and experiments reported above have not to be underrated. In
particular, each analysis seems to be very context-dependent. In many cases, participants are -
by definition - aware of the fact that their declarations and behaviour are produced in the
framework of an experiment, even though the actual objectives of the simulation may not be ex
ante disclosed to the participants. What is important in this respect is that participants are not
actually  experiencing  tangible/intangible  gains  and  losses.  In  fact,  it  would  be  arguably
unsustainable to observe choices without the participants’ consent, since this could entail a
violation of their privacy, and/or other rights. Moreover, results are not independent from the
way questions are formulated, and scenarios sketched. It is the case, for instance, of the already
mentioned endowment effect (Acquisti et al., 2009).
Moreover,  the  actual  definition  of  personal  data  varies  amongst  experiments  and  what  is
actually measured in each case is the value of preserving a certain subset of one’s personal data,
with  respect  to  a  certain  set  of  perceived  risks.  In  particular,  Huberman  et  al.  (2005)
demonstrate that the more undesirable a personal trait vis-à-vis the group average is, the more
valuable a single piece of private information will be. Therefore, if for instance we hypothesise
that a piece of information (e.g., weight) is valuable only if its level is far away from the average
(and maybe mainly if it is higher than that), the underlying distribution of the valuations for
individuals will be extremely skewed. The same goes with the work of Carrascal et al. (2011),
which reports how people attach different value to different pieces of personal information
(offline vs online generated personal data). Moreover, most of the studies considered in this
paper refer to disclosure as a dichotomous variable. In their settings, an individual may disclose
or not disclose a specific  piece of  information.  However,  individuals may in fact  decide to
misrepresent and report a false information instead of not disclosing. That would be especially
the case for services that require some degree of disclosure in order to obtain access (Jiang et al.,
2013).
Finally, some kind of ‘selection bias’ can be recognised. Experiments are frequently conducted
with  undergraduate  students  as  participants,  and,  in  general,  they  involve  categories  of
individuals characterised by a higher willingness to participate (e.g., because they are sensitive
to a reward, or simply because they tend to have more free time than others). As a result,
samples might be not sufficiently representative of internet users as a whole (and even less of
human beings in general).
MAKING DATA PORTABILITY ENFORCEABLE
LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE SURVEY
What  is  fairly  evident  from the  experiments  reported  above  is  that  people  differ  in  their
valuation of personal data, and in their willingness to trade privacy for money and/or for some
forms of convenience. Another point that seems to emerge is that contextual factors matter. As
noted by Nissembaum (2004), “no arenas of life are not governed by norms of information
flows”, which are rooted in contexts that are more specific than what is suggested by the pure
‘private’ vs ‘public’ dichotomy, i.e. crossing them, or belonging to a plurality of distinct realms.
When contextual elements are taken into account (including the cost and benefit of taking care
of one’s privacy in a given context), users seem to be willing to assign a non-negligible value to
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their privacy and therefore businesses could use privacy strategically, leveraging the protection
of  private information as a  competitive advantage.  More generally,  the empirical  literature
reviewed in this article seems to support the ongoing evolution in the data protection domain. At
least in certain situations, people seem to devote limited attention to the protection of their
personal  data,  and it  becomes a meme that privacy is  somehow old-fashioned, yet  new or
stronger rights are granted to individuals. This situation could be justified by a certain degree of
paternalism of a legislator who thinks that there is indeed a privacy paradox, and that the actual
preferences of individuals are the ones they declare and not the ones they reveal. However,
properly taking context into account frequently dispels this paradox, still  making clear that
privacy does matter and deserves legal protection, but also that it is not always easy/feasible
enough to change one’s behaviour just because of data protection related reasons. Therefore,
putting some burden on the shoulders of those who systematically treat large amounts of data -
and are frequently the cheapest cost avoiders6 for personal data risks related to a specific
business - may be a good policy choice. This would support ex ante privacy impact assessments
and similar obligations included in the proposed EU General Data Protection Regulation.
As a further aspect to be considered (or, possibly, as a further specification of the concept of
relevant context), the discrepancy between what people respond in a survey and their actual
behaviour may be due to the fact that personal data is not conceivable as a single good, but
should be considered as a bundle of goods to which different individuals attach different values.
When asked in a survey about the value they assign to personal data/privacy protection they
could probably think to the most valuable information they have in their ‘privacy bundle’. In a
real life context or a real life-like experiment the required information to access a service or to
perform a specific task may be of low value.
IMPROVING DATA PORTABILITY
The complexity and multidimensionality of any serious discussion about personal data suggests
that another welcome development in the domain of data protection regulation may consist in
facilitating the emergence of intermediaries allowing people to easily manage their own personal
data in a customised way (to accommodate for individuals’  heterogeneity, leaving room for
convenient and personalised services), keeping low the transaction costs involved in the process
and possibly monetising some data exchanges (since there is evidence that people do trade
privacy for money, to a certain extent), and keeping safe the data which is most sensitive for any
single person (which is an activity performed, so far, just by the individuals themselves7).
In this regard, new markets may be based on the new rights granted by the EU General Data
Protection Regulation, e.g., the right to data portability, that would give the opportunity for the
data subject to obtain a copy of the data from the controller,  and transmit it  into another
processing  system.  For  instance,  personal  data  could  be  managed by  agents  that  perform
services on behalf of the individual, such as ‘personal data vaults’. Intermediaries assisting users
in consumption choices by analysing and benchmarking their current consumption patterns
(exploiting the so-called smart disclosure (HTML) paradigm) are other examples of business-
oriented re-uses of personal data.
Empowering users’ ability to manage their own data would arguably make less burdensome long
term implications. In fact, one may submit that individuals act to protect their privacy as a result
of a comparison between the advantages and costs of keeping data under control (i.e. reaching
the optimal level of control over personal data). Frequently, the value of sharing data is high in
the short run, but one may change his mind (or simply his subjective situation) in the longer
run: today, despite the existence in the letter of the law of a broad set of rights actionable by
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individuals, the cost of actually managing one’s personal data is still very high (and possibly on
purpose), also because users may miss the long run implications of their short run choices, and
harmful  effects  may appear only later,  when unexpected data combinations are performed
downstream (Solove, 2013). Making data portability actionable would let users directly govern
such combinations as they best see fit.
However, to make this opportunity as attractive as it may seem on paper, several conditions
need to apply. Broadly speaking, actual data portability would be enhanced by reducing the cost
of  management  of  one’s  data  also  in  the  medium/long  run  through  technological  means
mandated by law (e.g., following technical guidelines designed by data protection authorities, in
order to avoid a quick obsolescence of the law). The role of technological means to monitor one’s
personal data should not be underrated. Even without implementing sophisticated approaches,
such as privacy by design, some simple arrangements could have a relevant impact here. For
instance, the establishment of a centralised registry in which data controllers should simply list
all the data subjects present in their databases (e.g., by e-mail, phone number, tax number, or
other of a set of predefined and unique identifiers) may be a first step to make data portability
rights enforceable in practice, trivially by making users easily aware of which data controller is
holding what data. Today, this is practically impossible and data subjects just notice cases in
which they feel directly bothered (e.g., when contacted) by data controllers. Moreover, there are
cases in which some data controllers become, e.g., a source of significant disturbance (think
about undesired e-mails, text messages, or phone calls), or they just start being mistrusted by
the data subject. In these cases, it would be precious to have a simple and cheap way to check if
the data controller actually declared to have data about the data subject, to check which data,
received from whom, under which prerogatives, as well as which services would be discontinued
asking for the deletion of such data. It is a common direct experience (at least, in Italy) that the
aforementioned check is quite burdensome for the data subject.
In conclusion, the extreme context-dependency of the evaluation of personal data suggests that
general rules are important, but also case-by-case arrangements are needed. On the one hand,
this supports the idea that business specific duties are appropriate, e.g., an ex ante personal data
impact assessment may be used to evaluate the specific data protection risks related with a given
business  model  and technology  applied  to  a  certain  set  of  data.  On the  other  hand,  it  is
appropriate to also allow individuals to customise their own level of care, depending on their
own subjective  evaluation  of  which  contexts  are  more  delicate  for  them in  terms  of  data
protection. To do that, individuals may need the support of infomediaries (e.g., to apply big data
analytics techniques in a defensive way), which could become a reality if  some technical and
legal preconditions apply: technology and standardisation are needed to make data portability
actually enforceable, and it should become clear that it is possible to delegate the exercise of
data portability related activities, so that third parties may build new data related business
models, at the service of data subjects.
METHODOLOGICAL APPENDIX
We limited the scope of this survey to studies that make use of field experiments and survey
methodologies  to  induce  the  users  of  privacy-sensitive  services  to  assign  a  value  to  their
personal data and to reveal their preferences on privacy protection. Moreover, since we are
mostly interested in studies that provide an assessment of how much individuals care about, and
value their personal information online, we dedicate special attention to works that analyse the
privacy valuation issue in the internet environment.  For this  reason, most of  the surveyed
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studies are not older than a decade.   
In order to identify relevant contributions on this specific topic, we searched the Google Scholar
database mainly using the following keywords: ‘economics of privacy’, ‘value of personal data’,
‘users’  valuation  of  personal  information’,  ‘empirical  analysis’,  ‘field  experiment’,  ‘online
information  privacy’.  The  bibliography  of  prima facie  relevant  works  was  then  iteratively
analysed, following citations. We limited our survey only to articles appearing in international
peer reviewed journals, belonging to the economic, the legal, and the information system fields,
and to proceedings of globally renowned conferences that devoted attention to the economics of
privacy,  such  as  e.g.,  the  European  Conference  on  Information  Systems  (ECIS)  and  the
Symposium On Usable Privacy and Security (SOUPS). After a preliminary analysis of several
titles and abstracts, some 30 contributions were scrutinised in depth (about two thirds of these
most relevant works are concentrated in the 2010 decade).
We then  considered  if  the  works  we  collected  provided  insights  about  three  main  issues:
whether an article adopted any empirical methodology to estimate the value that users assigned
to privacy; whether the study tried to investigate which contextual factors affected the personal
assessment  of  private  information;  and  whether  work  suggested  an  objective  formula  to
estimate the value of personal data on the basis of specific individuals’ attributes.
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FOOTNOTES
1. A brief methodological appendix is available at the end of the paper.
2. In particular, we focus on the ‘digital footprint’ of an individual, i.e. all data left behind by
users within their use of digital services, and the personally unique arrangement that makes
someone identifiable just upon the specific combination of her system information. As noted by
the OECD (2013), personal data is in fact collected online in different ways: (i) data can be
voluntarily  shared by  a  consumer;  (ii)  data  can be  observed or  recorded,  with  or  without
consumers’  knowledge,  or  explicit  consent;  (iii)  data  that  can  be  inferred.  In  other  cases
(Acquisti,  2010),  personal  data  remains  protected,  either  because  it  was  intentionally  not
disclosed by a consumer, or because the service provider is not able to access it.
3. The revealed preferences theory suggests that preferences of consumers can be inferred -
through appropriate methodologies - by their purchasing habits and choices.
4. WTP is the maximum price a person would be willing to pay to acquire a good she did not
own.
5. WTA can be defined as the lowest price a person would be willing to accept to part with a
good.
6. In law and economics, the cheapest cost avoider is the party which can prevent (or abate)
a potential damage at the lowest cost. In the domain of torts - e.g., in defining the law about car
accidents - the cheapest cost avoider should bear the responsibility in case of damages, so that
he/she receives an incentive to invest in precaution.
7. Technological developments such as big data analytics may challenge home-made solutions in
this domain.
